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State of Emergency: the Violence of the 
Sydney 2007 APEC Meeting
Nick Southall 
University of Wollongong
This article emphasises the activity of what will be referred 
to as the alter-globalisation movement rather than the anti-
globalisation movement, as I consider this a more accurate 
description of the global movement against neo-liberalism. It 
also examines the global state of emergency which has become 
increasingly evident since September 11, 2001. My aim is to 
help understand how and why this state of emergency was 
manifested during the APEC week in Sydney, September 2007. 
To shed more light on the implications of the state of emergency, 
the article traces a history of confrontations between those 
advocating neo-liberal globalisation and those opposing it.
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was 
formed in 1989 at the behest of the Hawke Labor government. 
Leaders of 21 of the economies of the Pacific Rim meet yearly, 
with working groups between Summits. APEC includes 
Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Russia and the United 
States and seeks to promote neo-liberal development policies 
and processes. In September 2007 it was Sydney’s turn to host 
the annual APEC summit. Preparations began months before, 
both for the Summit and its massive security operation, and for 
those who wished to protest against it.
The planned anti-APEC demonstrations in Sydney were 
initially centred on the visit of George Bush. As well, the call out 
for the main protest explained that “APEC furthers corporate 
globalisation bringing war, environmental destruction and a 
continual assault on worker’s rights and peoples livelihoods” 
(Stop Bush Coalition: 2007). But, as the Federal and NSW 
governments prepared for the demonstrations, the protests 
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APEC protests, Sydney, September 2007. 
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increasingly became about state repression and the ability to 
protest. In the lead up to the APEC meeting and the planned 
demonstrations against it, violence became a central issue. 
Many of those preparing to protest, sought to highlight the 
continuing violence of the Iraq war, as well as the everyday 
violence of neo-liberalism against people, communities and 
the planet. Meanwhile, the main issue for those supporting 
APEC and the neo-liberal state was the potential violence of 
protestors. h
In Australia, protests have at times been confrontational, 
for example the storming of Federal parliament in 1982 and 
1996 and the Maritime dispute in 1998. A year after the Maritime 
dispute, at the 1999 World Trade Organisation’s meeting in 
Seattle, the infamous “Battle of Seattle” occurred, launching the 
alter-globalisation movement onto the world stage. The Seattle 
protests against the WTO combined the many grievances of 
the North and the South against neo-liberal globalisation. This 
combination would demonstrate tremendous power in Seattle, 
disrupting and helping to derail the WTO meeting. The response 
from law enforcement has been described as a ‘police riot’. 
Having been attacked by the police, sections of the protestors 
began to defend themselves and some started smashing 
symbols of corporate power, at times joined by local inner city 
residents. By nightfall the city authorities had declared a state 
of emergency and sent in the National Guard.
The following year, inspired by the Seattle tactic of 
blockading meetings of the powerful, thousands of people 
blockaded every entrance into Melbourne’s Crown Casino, 
severely disrupting a meeting of the World Economic Forum. The 
s11 protest began turning ugly when police broke through the 
blockade using batons, horses and vehicles. During the three 
days of action five hundred blockaders had to be treated by 
medical officers. Many of them were so badly injured that they 
had to be hospitalised. The police operation to break the s11 
blockade, the largest police operation in Victoria’s history, had 
been planned for over a year, with the assistance of police from 
the United States (s11.org archive: 2000). The large amount of 
police violence prompted the Victorian Ombudsman to carry 
out a full investigation of the police’s actions. In the resulting 
report the s11 legal observers explained that “senior police and 
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the force in general seemed to approach the protest as if they 
were at war”. According to the Ombudsman’s report, police 
“statements to the media, the use of paramilitary equipment, 
tactics and units all contributed to increased conflict during 
the protest. Despite this, overall the actions of the protestors 
were very restrained and generally peaceful and non-violent. 
However, such restraint is by no means guaranteed and is likely 
to change if the use of paramilitary force continues to develop 
into the standard approach to policing of protests” (Victorian 
Ombudsman’s Report: 2001: 41).
In July the following year, Genoa Italy saw the largest 
demonstrations for alternative globalisation yet, when two 
hundred thousand people protested leading up to the G8 
Summit. This massive mobilisation was met with the most 
violent police response seen in Europe or North America to 
counter-summit protests, as the authorities and 20,000 police 
transformed the city into a war zone, under a form of marshal 
law. During the demonstrations “provocateurs and members 
of right-wing, Nazi groups . . . clad in black and moving in 
paramilitary fashion were given free reign” by police, while 
those peacefully marching were “viciously beaten . . . with a 
determination that was almost murderous”. As some protestors 
attempted to defend themselves the police launched further 
attacks, including the shooting death of Carlo Guiliani, and an 
attack later that night on a hundred sleeping protestors who 
were beaten “to the edge of their lives” and the torture of many of 
those arrested (Federici and Caffentzis: 2001: 291–292). Silvia 
Federici and George Caffentzis (2001: 290) explain that the 
strategy of terror at Genoa, involving “the abolition of all legal, 
civic, and human rights” was a “pre-meditated institutional 
plan to repress and terrorise the demonstrators” and that it 
“was not shaped by how activists behaved”.
According to Antonio Negri (2004: 76) the police violence 
in Genoa indicated the transition to “low intensity war combined 
with a high-intensity police action”, a fascistic development 
to block the new emerging cycle of struggles against neo-
liberalism. In response to this increased police violence, what 
began as a demonstration against the G8 “became transformed 
into a demonstration against war”. For Negri, Genoa was “an 
anticipation on both sides” of the post-September 11 global 
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war and Genoa’s message to the alter-globalisation movement 
was that protests are regarded as acts of subversion, peace 
demonstrations are regarded as acts of treason and “everything 
is potentially terrorism”.
As it became clear that the ‘Seattle tactics’ were now being 
thwarted and that direct action would be met by far superior 
and potentially deadly force, debates raged regarding the use 
of ‘violence’. At the centre of many of these debates were those 
taking part in the so-called “Black Blocs”. These protestors, 
usually dressed in black, were increasingly criticised for using 
‘violence’ and fighting back when attacked by police. Some 
suggested that they had been infiltrated by agent provocateurs, 
since those participating in the Blocs were usually masked, 
making it hard to identify them, but also making infiltration 
easier. Susan George, vice president of alter-globalisation 
movement ATTAC (in Callinicos: 2003: 136) explained that; “I 
cannot now encourage our members to put life and limb on 
the line, to participate in demos where we have police trapping 
people and shooting live ammunition on the one hand, and on 
the other the Black Bloc, completely infiltrated by police and 
fascists, running wild and apparently unable or unwilling to 
police its own ranks”. Negri (2008b: 95 & 98) in defence of 
black bloc tactics argued that many of the criticisms of the 
bloc disfigured those who were able to engage in conflict to 
resist state attacks and defend protesters. He pointed out that 
in Genoa violence was actively used by many protestors, well 
beyond the black blocs, in order to defend themselves.
By 2006, at protests against the G20 meeting in Melbourne, 
it was clear that global war had become permanent and the 
prediction of the s11 ombudsman’s report that protestors were 
unlikely to remain passive in the face of continued paramilitary 
policing was confirmed. When confronted by the police at G20 a 
section of protestors attempted to disarm them, pushed through 
police lines and smashed a police truck. One or two police 
officers were injured. Police retaliation for this defiance would 
injure over 50 protestors, hospitalising some. Following the G20 
demonstrations, many participants in the confrontations were 
targeted in an extensive police operation, codenamed Operation 
Salver. The Operation, involving both Victorian and New South 
Wales police, included raids on people’s homes by the NSW anti-
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terrorist squad and resulted in the imprisonment of at least 
one man for 18 months. Operation Salver also included the 
unprecedented release of ‘wanted’ photos of protestors to the 
media. Police refused to say whether those identified as persons 
of interest had committed any crimes, only that they were being 
sought by police (A Rush and a Push: 2008).
The events surrounding the G20 protests again 
sparked heated debates within activist circles about the 
use of confrontational tactics. A great deal of criticism of 
confrontational protestors referred to the use of masks and 
disguises. Most criticism of this tactic centred on the idea that 
“disguise” is sinister and that it leaves the movement open to 
infiltration by police and/or fascists. Some of those who had 
been wearing masks at G20 defended the tactic arguing that it 
protected militants from state repression (A First Communique 
of Two Uncitizens of Arterial Bloc: 2006). As it turned out, 
police had little problem identifying those taking part in G20 
confrontations, as they had infiltrated organising meetings and 
had plenty of images of the protests.
The debates following G20 are a small part of much 
wider and long-running debates about pacifism, non-violence, 
violence and democracy. In the lead up to the APEC protests in 
Sydney this debate flared again after the main protest march 
was initially advertised as a peaceful protest. In an open letter to 
those planning APEC protests, the Sydney based group Mutiny 
argued that an assertion of peaceful protest would close down 
discussion of different protest tactics. According to Mutiny 
(2007) it was irresponsible to promise or demand peace and the 
declaration of a peaceful protest was an attempt to marginalise 
and exclude those prepared to be disobedient, confront police 
and defend themselves.
Meanwhile, those supporting the need to publicise a 
peaceful march saw this as the best way to encourage people 
to attend in the face of police, government and media hysteria 
(Cunich: 2007). As one of them put it, the intent was to “make 
clear that the threat of violence comes not from protesters but 
from the Federal and State governments” (Clancy & Cunich: 
2007). As a letter writer argued in Green Left Weekly “it is 
entirely legitimate for an organised protest movement to set 
collectively decided limits on protest behaviour at rallies when 
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these limits are justified by the need for safety and unity” 
(Gaiswinkler: 2007). Yet, clearly there is not a unified movement 
and at the following meeting of the Stop Bush Coalition the 
majority supported a motion to remove the line “Join a peaceful 
protest against the warmongers” from the poster advertising the 
main protest march (Cunich: 2007). A short time later some 
of the protest organisers held a public meeting on a “Shared 
Intent Against the Violence of APEC”. In the call out for this 
meeting they explained: “By the very praxis of stepping out 
and challenging their control of space, we are committing what 
is regarded as a violent act. It is the violence of articulating 
resistance” (A Call for Shared Intent Against the Violence of 
APEC: 2007). While these discussions and debates may seem 
to be isolated to a few activists, the APEC protest organising 
meetings were not necessarily small meetings. For instance, on 
the night before the main protest march, hundreds of people 
packed an inner-city church hall to overflowing in order to 
discuss the final route of the march and whether to enter the 
declared security zone around the APEC meeting.
A couple of months before the APEC meeting, NSW Police 
Minister David Campbell (2007) introduced the APEC Police 
Powers Bill to Parliament. He justified the new laws in the face 
of what he said was “the threat of large organised and sustained 
violent protests”. The NSW Council on Civil Liberties (2007) 
described the new laws as akin to those of a police state and part 
of an increasing criminalisation of protest and dissent in NSW. 
The laws created two categories of security zones within greater 
Sydney – “declared areas” and “restricted areas” – which were to 
be determined by the NSW Police Commissioner. According to 
Mr. Campbell, if anyone did not obey orders to disperse or leave 
these areas, they could be arrested and held in jail until after 
APEC was over.
The most controversial part of the APEC Police Powers 
Bill was the creation of an “excluded persons list”. Those on the 
list faced lengthy jail terms if they entered any of the restricted 
or declared zones, even if they didn’t know that they were on 
the list. It was not necessary to have criminal convictions to be 
placed on the list. The Police Commissioner could put anyone 
on the list based on police intelligence. Initially Mr Campbell 
declared that those on the list would not be named and that 
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they didn’t need to be told they were on the list – that they 
should just know (Tadros: 2007). After a public outcry, those 
on the initial list were publicly named, although the police 
admitted that the list could still be added to, at any time. It 
was also announced that police would be using preventative 
detention and had been issued photographs and details of those 
they described as “known vicious protesters”. Airports would 
be on alert to look for any of these people entering the country 
and the interstate movements of ‘known troublemakers’ would 
be monitored (Lawrence: 2007). To help gather information on 
protest plans the police intelligence groups sought to recruit 
spies from among activist circles and asked universities to 
monitor any activity in support of the protests occurring on 
campuses (Tadros: 2007).
For months leading up to APEC police and troops trained 
for conflict, purchased new weapons, including a $600,000 water 
cannon, and prepared to carry out attacks on demonstrators. 
Senior NSW police announced they planned to arrest hundreds 
of people, and were clearing jail cells, as well as building a 
fleet of special jail buses to be able to herd large numbers of 
demonstrators into detention. While there was an occasional 
mention of potential terrorist attacks, the massive police and 
military operation was clearly aimed at those attempting to 
protest. As APEC drew closer the Federal and State governments 
and the NSW police carried out a scare campaign in relation to 
the APEC protests. As part of this campaign Premier Iemma 
put together a special taskforce of Muslim leaders to help 
urge Muslims to stay away from the demonstrations (Kerbaj: 
2007). Sydneysiders were given a public holiday and advised 
to get out of town, and much of the city became a no-go zone, 
enclosed in an iron cage. As the rhetoric of authorities created 
an intensifying climate of danger, fear and menace, it was clear 
that they were trying to threaten and intimidate people, to deter 
them from protesting and attempting to demonise those who 
would be. From my own experience this scare campaign was 
very successful, with many activists deciding not to attend the 
protests, expressing heightened concerns for those who were, 
and at times attempting to dissuade people from taking part.
In the week leading up to APEC, the police and media 
hysteria was ramped up a notch. The Illawarra Mercury (2007: 
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1) announced on its front page that police were “braced for 
riots” with senior police warning that a “violent riot is probable” 
at the main demonstration. Two days before the main protest 
the Mercury (2007: 4–5) headline emblazoned across two pages 
declared “Top cop warns: it’s going to get nasty”. In the article 
below this headline New South Wales top riot squad officer, 
Chief Superintendent Cullen, said he was expecting “the 
worst violence of his career”, a level of violence “not previously 
experienced in Sydney”. He told the media that “Police lines will 
come under attack and a full-scale riot is probable”.
 Just a couple of days before the APEC meeting began, the 
mainstream media outlets and the Police Minister announced 
that they had uncovered a ‘rioters training manual’ which 
they claimed “openly declares an intent to commit violence”. 
The evidence provided for this claim of violent intent was some 
of the articles published in the counter-APEC conference 
reader that the initial form of this article appeared in. Those 
attending the ‘FLARE (For Liberation, Autonomy, Resistance, 
Exodus) in the Void’ convergence were described in the media 
as “rioters” and the organisers declared public enemy number 
one. According to media outlets, the FLARE in the Void reader 
called for violence by advocating “direct action” and by stating 
“It is important to defy police attempts to frighten us”. Prime 
Minister Howard quickly responded to the reports of a riot 
manual, saying that if violence occurred “people should not 
blame him or Mr Bush. Don’t blame the police, don’t blame 
the NSW Government, don’t blame any of our guests, and don’t 
blame the Federal Government. Blame the people who threaten 
violence” (Hilderbrand & Farr: 2007: 1 & 8).
On the day of the main APEC protest, around ten 
thousand people took part. The frenzied media, political and 
police campaigns failed to deter thousands of people from 
a wide variety of community organisations – trade unions, 
indigenous rights, environmental, socialist, communist, 
anarchist, Christian and Muslim groups. There were young 
and old people, families with their children and even babies in 
strollers. Arriving at the assembly point in front of Sydney Town 
Hall they were surrounded by thousands of police, many in riot 
gear and backed by police dogs, riot vehicles and the new water 
cannon. Police helicopters hovered overhead and snipers were 
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stationed on rooftops. Arguments about which route to take and 
whether to march into the security zones were answered by the 
caged jail buses, which barricaded the proposed march route, 
totally blocking access to George and Pitt Streets. As speakers 
addressed the crowd and people filled the road preparing to 
march, behind them assembled a group in silent formation, 
clad all in black, masked, and with an air of menace. Although 
they had banners with anarchist and anti-corporate slogans 
on them, they were quickly identified by protest organisers as 
neo-Nazis. An announcement from the speaker’s stage was 
made that they were provocateurs and possibly police agents. 
APEC protest organisers had pre-warned the media of possible 
police provocation, pointing out that after an alter-globalisation 
demonstration in Quebec a few weeks before APEC, Canadian 
police were forced to admit that some of their officers had joined 
the protest dressed in masks and ‘black bloc’ attire and armed 
themselves with rocks to throw at lines of riot police (Harrold: 
2007).
According to the website of the Sydney neo-Nazi group 
joining the protest, they considered themselves part of the ‘new 
right’. On this site they explained that they came to the APEC 
protest with the intention of blending in with anarchist groups 
as part of the ‘black bloc’ (Middleton: 2007). But there was no 
‘black bloc’ at the APEC protest and the neo-Nazis stood out 
because they were the only people dressed all in black and 
masked. Obviously many others had learnt a lesson from the 
G20 protests, that masks and disguises would not prevent 
identification and that those wearing them could be considered 
a danger to those who were not. The neo-Nazis, positioning 
themselves between the police water cannon, some riot police 
and the back of the protest, were blocked from marching by 
sections of protestors and were eventually escorted away by the 
police to safety. According to the Sydney Morning Herald (2007) 
there were some scuffles, involving these neo-Nazis, but as the 
Herald reported, the rest of the protest was mostly peaceful 
and largely had a carnival atmosphere. Two police officers were 
injured when they were assaulted by a man, reportedly a One 
Nation supporter, who was promptly arrested. There were 16 
other arrests during the protest. Ten men and six women were 
charged with the minor offences of offensive conduct, resisting 
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arrest, breaching a secure area and hindering police. There were 
also scuffles when police tried to arrest two protest organisers 
who were on the APEC excluded persons list. The police were 
soon forced to release them, when legal observers pointed out 
that they were not in an exclusion zone.
These arrests added to the arrests in the days before, which 
included the detention of a homeless man for taking photos of 
the security fence (Hildebrand: 2007) and an accountant trying 
to cross the road with his child (Benns: 2007). This latter arrest 
received a great deal of media attention, helping to expose the 
aggressive nature of APEC policing. By the end of the APEC week 
many media outlets and commentators were asking serious 
questions about the behaviour of the police and government. An 
ABC poll shortly after APEC, into what concerned people about 
the APEC week, found that the majority were mostly concerned 
about the increased police powers, the heavy policing and the 
tough methods used during the demonstrations (ABC Sydney: 
2007).
However, during the APEC week the police were kept 
busy. Their hands were full, dealing with regular outbreaks of 
humour across the city. These outbreaks of humour included a 
fifty bum salute for George Bush, a group of people dressed in 
business suits, calling themselves the “Billionaires for Bush”, 
who stood and heckled protest marchers with chants such as 
“corporate might, not human rights” (Sydney Morning Herald: 
2007). And of course there was the Chaser team, who managed 
to enter the main APEC security cordon with a motorcade and 
Julian Morrow dressed as Osama Bin Laden. This use of protest 
humour as a weapon against repression has been an important 
element of the alter-globalisation movement, which has regularly 
used it to try and defuse tension and confuse police. In Quebec 
City a giant catapult trundled up towards police lines only to be 
used to lob soft toys at them. When Reclaim the Streets activists 
were confronted by police violence in England “the weapon of 
choice was . . . the custard pie” (Klein: 2001: 322), while the 
Revolutionary Anarchist Clown Bloc would run at police lines 
with squeaky toy mallets and then attack each other (Graeber: 
2003: 330).
In examining the confrontations between state forces and 
the alter-globalisation movements, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
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Negri (1994: 204) explain that capitalist society is a “monster 
of provocation and devastation” and constitutional bourgeois 
democracy is a “theory of the management of legitimate violence” 
(Negri: 2008a: 129). They point out that the neo-liberal project 
has involved “a substantial increase of the State in terms 
both of size and powers of intervention” to deal with capitalist 
crisis (Hardt and Negri: 1994: 242). While advocating less 
state intervention, neo-liberal states have boosted the prison 
population and introduced more repressive laws governing such 
things as protest, strikes, behaviour, movement, use of public 
space, censorship and other civil rights. While cutting back 
spending on the ‘social security’ of welfare, spending on state 
security forces has been increased and these forces are called 
on to intervene wherever capital is threatened or challenged.
According to Hardt and Negri (2004) the fear of violence 
and the constant and coordinated application of violence are used 
to maintain capitalist social relations, social hierarchies, social 
anxiety and conflict. They describe the contemporary situation 
as one of “permanent exceptionalism”. While states tend to have 
provisions to suspend civil liberties in times of emergency these 
exceptional circumstances are now considered permanent and 
general. State policies and practices for events such as APEC 
are touted as temporary – but they are increasingly becoming 
a feature of the urban environment. When he introduced the 
special APEC laws David Campbell (2007) assured the NSW 
parliament that they included a number of safeguards to ensure 
they were not abused. One of these safeguards was that the laws 
would terminate automatically after the APEC meeting. Since 
then the government has announced that they have decided to 
keep them (Mills: 2008).
 In many ways the state of emergency that was declared 
in Seattle in 1999 did not end, but instead spread across the 
globe. Yet looked at in another, and probably more accurate, 
way the state of emergency in Seattle was the materialisation, 
in the heart of North America, of a permanent state of exception 
that has long existed in many parts of the world. According 
to Walter Benjamin (1940) “the tradition of the oppressed 
teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not 
the exception but the rule”. In the contemporary metropolis 
the first and third world, the north and south, the centre and 
17
periphery, are to different degrees infused and here the state of 
emergency and exception is continuous. Unprecedented levels 
of social inequality are helping to fuel increasing hostility, on 
the part of wide layers of the global population, to the entire 
official establishment. The politics of social compromise 
and concessions that characterised the years of the post-
war economic boom, have given way to social tensions and a 
deepening social polarisation that cannot be contained through 
the old political channels. That is why, as Nick Dyer-Witheford 
(1999: 78) explains, the neo-liberal transition from welfare 
state to warfare state is supported by the adoption of military 
technology to provide ‘battlefield control’ in the workplace and 
civil society.
Many cities are now considered permanent zones of 
conflict. As the Journal of the U.S. Army War College (2008) 
explains: “The future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, 
high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, 
shacks, and shelters that form the broken cities of our world”. 
According to geographer Professor Stephen Graham (2006) 
contemporary cities are divided into two classes – citizens who 
are deemed to warrant value and the full protection of citizenship, 
and those that have been deemed threatening, the targets of the 
security state. Who those considered threatening might be, in 
the city of Sydney, was indicated during the training of police 
helicopter flight crews preparing for APEC, who targeted 149 
hot spots across the western suburbs (Creedy: 2007). The Daily 
Telegraph (Watson: 2007) also pointed to the similarities of police 
training for APEC and their training for urban rioting in places 
like Redfern and Macquarie Fields. According to the Telegraph 
(Massoud: 2007) the NSW riots squads’ APEC tactics were also 
tested before-hand on unruly western suburbs football fans at 
a Parramatta versus Canterbury-Bankstown game.
The major confrontations of the future are expected 
to involve a melding of policing and military operations and 
Australian military/police forces are increasingly being deployed 
at home and abroad. On top of their roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Australian troops and police have recently been deployed across 
the Pacific from the Northern Territory to the Solomon Islands, 
East Timor, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. These military 
interventions have included Australian assistance to what John 
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Pilger (Pilger: 2006) describes as the “coup” in East Timor to 
overthrow the elected Prime Minster and the establishment of a 
permanent military base in the fledgling state (O’Malley: 2006). 
In the Solomon Islands Australian troops, police and officials 
have taken over the running of the country and Australian 
police have been installed in Papua New Guinea, Nauru and 
Vanuatu. The leaders of Tonga’s pro-democracy movement have 
condemned the intervention of Australian soldiers and police in 
that country to enforce martial law (ABC News: 2006). These 
Australian forces are deployed to impose the APEC agenda of 
neo-liberal reforms, law and order measures and the removal 
of barriers for business. Since these processes involve mass 
impoverishment, environmental destruction and the erosion of 
communal and cooperative social relations and structures, they 
are widely resisted.
For all the talk of violence, the meanings of the term 
are rarely examined. ‘Violence’ is often a catch-all phrase 
which is relatively easy to condemn. Yet, what is classified as 
violence reflects the concerns and priorities of different classes, 
movements, social groups and individuals. Some kinds of 
violence and some kinds of actions that cause harm, injury and 
death, are considered far worse than others. It is a common 
perception, promoted by capital, its state forms and media 
outlets, to view violence as the illegitimate use of force. Peace 
demonstrators can be described as “violent ferrals” by Prime 
Minister Rudd (in Braithwaite & Tadros: 2007) and the bombing 
of children as ‘combating terror’. The definition of violence as 
illegitimate force allows those who claim they are ‘defending 
the law’ and ‘protecting social order’ to present themselves as 
opposed to violence, as the protectors and keepers of ‘the peace’. 
Accepting these parameters helps to disguise the daily violence 
of oppression, condones state violence and delegitimises militant 
struggle against the status quo. The reality is that the social 
relations of capital are violent and that capitalist states employs 
police, the military, prison and other violent institutions to 
repress dissent. Many people, in resisting the imposition of 
the violence of capitalist rule, defend themselves physically. 
Yet much of the alter-globalisation movement appreciates that 
even defensive violence can compromise attempts to create 
alternative social relations.
19
Faced with the shock of a permanent state of emergency 
and the awesome power of capitalist political, economic and 
armed forces, there is a continuing global wave of disobedience, 
defiance and rebellion, that will continue to bring to the fore 
questions of violence, non-violence, power and democracy. At 
the same time millions of people across the globe understand 
that peace – not violence – is the fundamental condition for 
liberating, cooperative and creative social relations. The 
intention in this paper has not been to deny that some of those 
involved in alter-globalisation movements engage in violence 
and there are those who rage against the machine in ways 
that are mirror images of the violence of capital and its state 
forms. What I have sought to show, is that at APEC, militant 
non-violence helped to counter the demonisation of those who 
protest and resist and exposed the violent practice and intent 
of state forces. The APEC protests revealed that many people 
refuse to be threatened, intimidated or forced into compliance 
and silence. Despite a global environment of war and terror, it 
is still possible to come together in collective action, to create 
spaces for different points of view and to deploy fluid and varied 
protest tactics. Rather than being caught up in an escalating 
competition of violence, antagonism can be combined with 
optimism rather than despair. In response to the global state of 
emergency and global war many continue to refuse and reject 
the neo-liberal agenda and organise forms of power that are 
effective, angry and affectionate, rather than violent.
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